Western New England Law Review
Volume 2 2 (1979-1980)
Issue 1

Article 6

1-1-1979

PATENT LAW—PATENTS AND TRADE
SECRETS—DOES FEDERAL LAW PREEMPT
STATE LAW? Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co.,
440 U.S. 257 (1979)
Marian S. Lubinsky

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Marian S. Lubinsky, PATENT LAW—PATENTS AND TRADE SECRETS—DOES FEDERAL LAW PREEMPT STATE LAW?
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979), 2 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 111 (1979), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/
lawreview/vol2/iss1/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons
@ Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

NOTES
PATENT LAW-PATENTS AND TRADE SECRETS-DoES FEDERAL

LAw PREEMPT STATE LAW? Aronson v. Qwck Pomt Pencil Co.
440 U.S. 257 (1979).

1.

INTRODUCTION

In 1956 Jane Aronson gave QUIck Pomt Pencil Company an

exclusIve license to make and sell keyholders that she had de
sIgned. The license agreement provIded that Aronson receIve roy
alties at the rate of 5 percent of gross revenues, to be reduced to
21,2 percent if no patent Issued withm five years of the contract
date. The agreement was to be bmding as long as QUIck Pomt con
tmued to sell the keyholders. No patent was Issued and QUIck
Pomt paId more than $200,000 m royalties from July 1957 through
September 1975. In the late 1960's, competitors began makmg SIm
ilar keyholders, havmg the advantage of not paymg royalties. Qmck
Pomt's share of the market was subsequently reduced.
In November 1975, Qmck Pomt asked for a declaratory Judg
ment that it no longer had to pay royaltIes. 1 The distnct court
treated the case as a contract case, governed by contract law It
held for Aronson, notmg that the language of the contract was
plaIn, clear, and uneqmvocal" and that QUIck Pomt had contmued
to pay royalties long after the Patent Office had rejected the de
fendant's patent. 2
Qmck Pomt appealed, argumg that the distnct court erred m
finding that the case was governed by contract law without regard
for federal patent and antitrust consideratIons. 3 The Court of Ap
peals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the distnct court's decIsIOn m
Qwck Pomt Pencil Co. v. Aronson,4 ruling that the Issue mvolved
the relatIonshlp between state contract law and federal patent law
Charactenzmg Qmck Pomt as a patent application licensee, the
court of appeals vIewed the Issue as whether Qmck Pomt was
"bound by the contractual prOVISIon reqUIrmg it to pay royalties for
as long as it manufactures the item described m the patent applica
tion even though the licensor abandoned the application many
1. 425 F Supp. 600, 601 (E.D. Mo. 1976).
2. ld. at 602.
3. QUIck Pomt Pencil Co. Aronson, 567 F.2d 757, 759 (8th Cir. 1977).
4. 567 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1977), rev d, 440 U.S. 257 (1979).
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years ago and the licensee s competitors are freely manufacturmg
the unpatented item."5 If a patent had Issued, the court reasoned,
Qmck Pomt's liability would have termmated when the patent ex
pIred after seventeen years. Also, Qmck Pomt could have chal
lenged the patent's validity before then, possibly termmatmg liabil
ity earlier 6 The court then concluded that the license agreement
contravened the policy of the federal patent laws because the li
censor whose patent applicahon was demed was gIven more pro
techon than if a patent had been Issued. 7 The majority disputed the
dissent's charactenzahon of the contract as a "trade-secret licensmg
agreement," argumg that smce marketmg completely disclosed the
keyholder, it could not be secret. 8
The dissentmg Justice found the eXIstence of a patent applica
tion Irrelevant,9 vIewmg the Issue as whether a contract extending
payments beyond the duration of secrecy IS enforceable. The dis
sent answered the majority s disagreement with its charactenzahon
of the contract by notmg that the keyholder was secret at the time
of disclosure and not copIed until long after it had been marketed.
He saw the fact that marketing may lead to copymg as the reason
that parties enter agreements requmng payments after disclosure
has been made. 10 The dissent concluded that the contract did not
conflict with any federal policy
The United States Supreme Court granted Aronson s petition
for certIorar1. 11 It agreed to decIde the extent to whICh the eXIS
tence of a patent applicatIOn affects the Issue of federal preemption
when a contract licensmg usage of an Idea IS m conflict with federal
patent law If a patent had been Issued, Qmck Pomt could have
challenged the validity of the patent. A successful challenge could
have excused the duty to pay royalties under the contract. Since
the patent was not Issued, Qmck Pomt was demed thIS opportu
nity In light of these facts, it was necessary to resolve whether a
contract that afforded Aronson benefits greater than she would have
enjoyed if a patent had been granted VIOlated federal patent policy
In a rather cursory opmIOn 12 the Supreme Court unammously re
versed the court of appeals, holding that the contract should be en
Id. at 759, 760.
Id. at 762.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 760 n.S.
9. Id. at 762.
lO. Id. at 763 n.4.
11. 436 U.S. 943 (1978).
12. 440 U.S. at 266.

5.
6.
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forced because it did not conflict with federal patent policy 13 It
dismIssed the possibility that Aronson mIght be recelvmg a greater
YIeld without a patent as a matter of speculatIon. "14 In upholding
the contract, the Court necessarily had to confront four preVIOUS
Supreme Court cases mterpretmg federal patent policy and the ex
tent to whICh that policy preempts state powers.
II. BACKGROUND
The ConstitutIon grants Congress the power to promote the
Progress of SCIence and useful Arts, by secunng for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclUSIve Right to theIr respective
Writmgs and Dlscovenes. "15 A question anses as to whether con
stitutional authority exercIsed by federal patent laws preempts
vanous prOVlSlOns of state law protectmg "Authors and Inventors.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. IS and Compco Corp. v.
Day Bnte Ltghttng, Inc. 17 were compamon cases m whIch the
United States Supreme Court ruled that state unfau competition
laws makmg it illegal to copy products whICh were not protected
by a federal patent or a copynght were mconSlStent with the obJec
tives of the federal patent laws. In ruling that state law was
preempted, Justice Black, writmg for the Court, stated: "Just as a
State cannot encroach upon the federal patent laws directly it can
not, under some other law such as that forbIdding unfaIr competi
tion, gIVe protection of a kmd that clashes with the objectives of
the federal patent laws. "18 The breadth of thIS and other state
ments m the Sears and Compco oplmons gave nse to preemption
objections regarding other state laws, mcluding trade secret laws.
Preemption objections prompted the Supreme Court, m Lear
Inc. v. Adktns, 19 to overrule a preVIOUS declSlon m whICh the eXlst
13. Id. at 263.
14. Id. at 264.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § B, c1. B.
16. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
17. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
lB. 376 U.S. at 231. Sears dealt with IllinOls unfau competition laws. Under
those laws, Sears, Roebuck & Co. was en)omed from manufactunng lamps copied
from an unpatented deSign by the StifIel Co. The court of appeals m essence held
Sears liable for domg no more than copymg and marketing an unpatented article.
Id. at 227. Justice Black deCISIOn was consistent with trade secret prmClples whICh
allow no protection agamst copymg or reverse engmeermg. The broad language,
however, raised an Issue of patent preemption of trade secret law Milgnm, Sears to
Lear to Pamton: Of Whales and Other Matters, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv 17 (1971).
19. 395 U.S. 653 (1969). Adkms, mechamcal engmeer employed by Lear Co.
had developed and patented method of construction whICh produced gyroscope ac
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ence of a licensmg agreement was deemed to estop a licensee from
challengmg a patent. 20 ConsIstent with Sears the Court noted that
federal law reqUIred that, unless covered by a valid patent, all
Ideas m general cIrculatIOn be used for the benefit of the public. 21
The Court declined, however, to follow the broad language of
Sears and concluded that it should not attempt m any way to de
termme what limitations, if any eXIst to prevent states from
enforcmg contracts mvolvmg unpatented secret Ideas. 22 Once agam
the preCIse contours of federal preemption of state protection of m
ventIons was an open question.
Kewanee Oil Co. v Bicron Corp.23 attempted to resolve the
question of whether federal patent law preempts state trade secret
protectIon. 24 The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. It held that an OhIO statute was not pre
empted,25 and states may protect mtellectual property relatmg to
mventIon. ChIef Justice Burger satd that the state was limited m
regulatmg the area of patents and copynghts only to the extent that
they did not conflict with the operation of laws m thIS area passed
by Congress. 26 The Court analyzed possible conflict m terms of
three categones of trade secrets: (1) A trade secret believed by its
owner to constitute a validly patentable mventIon; (2) a trade secret
curacy at low cost. In
17 page contract, Lear had promised to pay royalties for
Adkms Improvements. The Supreme Court of California had ruled that the eXistence
of thiS contract estopped Lear from challengIng the validity of the patent.
20. [d. at 671 (overruling Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research Inc.,
339 U.S. 827 (1950)).
21. 395 U.S. at 668.
22. [d. at 675. Justice Black objected In his concurrIng opmlOn to thiS omission
as bemg In conflict with Sears and Compeo. "[P]nvate arrangements under whICh
self-styled Inventors do not keep their discovenes secret, but rather disclose them,
m return for contractual payments, run counter to the plan of our patent laws.
Id. at 677. Justice White, however, In his concurrIng OpInIOn, pomted out that he
found nothIng In the record and nothIng In thiS Court' opInIOn Indicating that Lear
at any time contended In the state courts that once AdkIns patent was mvalidated,
the royalty agreement was unenforceable as matter of federal law. [d. at 679.
23. 416 U.S. 470 (1974). ApplYIng OhIO trade secret law, federal district court
enJomed the disclosure or use of 20 claimed trade secrets by fonner employees of
the company until the trade secret had been released or had become available to the
public or had been obtamed by respondents from sources havmg the legal nght to
convey the InformatIon. The IndiVidual respondents had Signed agreements not to
disclose confidential Information or trade secrets. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed, finding conflict with federal patent laws.
24. [d. at 472.
25. 416 U.S. at 474 & n.4. The OhIO statute forbids the use of trade secret
without the owner consent when that secret had been learned with the owner
consent. OHIO REv CODE ANN. § 1333.51(c) (Page Supp. 1978).
26. 416 U.S. at 479.
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known to its owner not to be patentable; and (3) a trade secret
whose valid patentability was In doubt. 27 In none of these three
categones did the Court find conflict whICh would prevent the
proper operatIon of the federal patent laws. The Court, however
did not explicitly find that there was no conflict between federal
patent law and trade secret licensmg agreements. 28 ConfuSIon on
thIS Issue and its mteractIon with state contract law IS exemplified
by the court of appeals declSlon m Qutek Pomt. The Supreme
Court opmlOn, however, found enforcement of Qmck POInt's roy
alty agreement with Aronson even less offensIve to federal patent
poliCIes than state law protectmg trade secrets. "29 Thus, the validity
of a royalty agreement for a penod longer than seventeen years re
garding an unpatented item IS assured. The policy problems, how
ever, still remam.

III.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

Possible conflict between state trade secret protectIon or state
contract law and the federal patent law necessarily must be dis
cussed In terms of the poliCieS underlYIng the federal patent sys
tem. VOlding a state law on the grounds of federal preemptIon
Involves considermg whether that law mterferes with "the ac
complishment and executIon of the full purposes and objectIves of
Congress."30 The congresslOnal purpose of the patent laws IS to
27. [d. at 484 (citing Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224 (2d Cir.
1971». Because trade secret laws prOVide weaker protection than patent laws In that
they do not forbid use of the secret when discovered Independently or through re
verse engIneenng, the Court found that the possibility of an Inventor with patenta
ble Invention relYing on trade secret law was remote. 416 U.S. at 490. Trade secret
law produces benefiCial results to owners of only doubtfully patentable and clearly
unpatentable Inventions. Little would be accomplished by abolishing trade secret
protection for unpatentable Inventions. "The mere filing of applications doomed to
be turned down by the Patent Office will bnng forth no new public knowledge or
enlightenment.
[d. at 485. Regarding Inventions with doubtful patentability, the
Court found no conflict with patent law
Eliminating trade secret law for the doubtfully patentable Invention IS
likely to have deletenous effects on society and patent policy which we can
not say are balanced out by the speculative gain which might result from the
encouragement of some Inventors with doubtfully patentable Inventions
which deserve patent protection to come forward and apply for patents.
[d. at 489.
28. The Kewanee Court did Implicitly endorse the enforcement of trade secret
licenSing agreements by noting the economic waste that would result if thiS protec
tion were abolished. [d. at 486-87
29. 440 U.S. at 266.
30. 416 U.S. at 479 (citing Hines v. Davldowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941»; see 440
U.S. at 262.
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promote mventIon, while at the same tIme preservmg free compe
titIon. 31
The patent system IS based on the qmd pro quo of the grant of
exclusIVe nghts for a penod of years m return for public disclosure
of the mventIOn. 32 A patent mcludes the exclusIve nghts to make,
sell, and use, as well as the nght to license others to do so. These
nghts are limited, however, by a term of years, and any royalty
agreement by the patentee that goes beyond the expIratIon date of
the patent IS unlawful per se. 33 ThIS IS consonant with the concern
emphaSIzed m Sears and Compco that competitIon not be re
stncted.
Patents are often described as limited monopolies, and as
such, militate agamst free competitIOn. In the case of a patent,
however, a monopoly IS offered by the government for a limited
penod m order to promote mventIon. Without thIS mcentIve, m
ventors mIght not nsk the expense of both tIme and money m re
search of new Ideas. Since the mventor always has the optIon of
not revealing hIS mventIon, a limited monoply IS offered as protec
tIon m consIderatIon for public disclosure. Sears and Compco ex
pressed the Court's concern regarding state protectIon for
unpatented Ideas, and Lear s pnmary concern was with the exten
SIon of thIs kmd of limited monopoly protectIon to an mventIon
whICh mIght not have been validly patented.
Trade secret protectIon does not mterfere with the patent pol
ICY of promotmg mventIon. It offers protectIon to Ideas that are not
consIdered deservmg of patent protectIon,34 and may be consIdered
a supplemental mcentIve to mventIon. The traditIonal concern re
garding possible conflict with patent policy has been the preserva
tIon of free competitIon by way of public disclosure of the Idea.
Histoncally it was antICIpated that few mventors would decline the
temporary monopoly afforded by a patent because the trade secret
route contamed nsks m terms of preservatIon of the secret. 35 Since
patents are costly to obtam and patent suits are notonously expen
SIve to defend,36 the concern today IS that many compames are
31. 376 u.s. at 230-31.
32. P ROSENBERG, PATENT LAw FuNDAMENTALS 7 (1975).
33. Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964).
34. The CommiSSIOner of the Patent Office makes this determmation mitially
based on novelty usefulness and nonobvlOusness. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03, 131
(1976).
35. Orenbuch, Trade Secrets and the Patent Laws, 52 J. PAT. OFF SOC'y 638
(1970).
36. Milgnm, supra note IB, at 28 n.48, 32 n.63. Although research has not dis
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chOOSIng to use trade secrets, thereby aVOIding the disclosure ne
cessitated by the patent system. The fear IS that the alms of the
patent system are beIng cIrcumvented. 37
In awarding a limited monopoly to an Inventor as consIdera
tIon for disclosure of hIS InventIon to the public, the patent system
benefits both the Inventor and the public. Trade secret laws, on
the other hand, offer less protectIon to an Inventor, but do not re
qmre disclosure. If the product cannot be easily discovered Inde
pendently or through reverse engIneenng, an Inventor can possess
a monopoly for longer than the statutory seventeen years, poten
tIally reapmg rewards greater than those afforded by the patent
system. Thus, the Inventor prospers without the public benefitmg.
Disagreement, however, eXIsts regarding the nature of the alms
of federal patent policy In hIS concurnng OpInIOn In Kewanee 38
JustIce Marshall noted that trade secret protectIon was sometImes
more attractIve to Inventors than the patent system, but he did
not find that dispositIve. He saw the Issue as whether Congress
enacted the patent laws merely to offer Inventors a limited mo
nopoly m exchange for disclosure of theIr mventIon, or Instead to
exert pressure on Inventors to enter mto thIs exchange by with
drawmg any alternatIve possibility of legal protectIon for theIr m
ventIons. "39 He deCIded that the former was the case. 40 JustIce
Douglas, m hIS dissent, vehemently disagreed. He mterpreted
Sears and Compco as standing for the propositIon that "every artI
cle not covered by a valid patent IS m the public domaln. "41
The United States Supreme Court m Goldstem v. Califorma 42
took a mIddle ground, contending that the constitutIonal mandate
to "promote" mventIon meant to "stImulate, to "encourage," or to
"induce."43 Thus, there 1S disagreement whether federal patent
policy precludes the eX1stence of an alternatIve system. Qutck Pomt
does not expressly confront th1s, but by ImplicatIon it would appear
that Ch1ef JustIce Burger, writmg for the Court, would agree with
closed any statistics on the frequency of litigation connected with patents as opposed
to trade secrets, Lear and the monetary Incentive for
patent licensee to litigate
would suggest that there would be more frequent litigation for the possessor of
patent. 395 U.S. at 653.
37. Orenbuch, supra note 35, at 674-75.
38. 416 U.S. at 493.
39. ld. at 494.

40. ld.
41. ld. at 495. Justice Douglas futher expressed hiS belief that the Constitution
expresses an activist policy. ld. at 499 {citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8}.

42. 412 U.S. 546 {1972}.
43. ld. at 555.
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JustIce Marshall, that the purpose of the patent laws was merely an
offer by Congress of a limited monopoly He sees the Aronson
agreement as consonant with federal patent policy finding nothmg
wrong with an additIonal mcentIve to mventIon"44 outsIde of the
patent system.
Trade secret law on the other hand, grew out of a deSIre to
perpetuate ethICal dealing m a busmess context. 45 It IS based on a
varIety of theorIes, mcluding breach of contract, breach of confi
dence, VIOlatIon of fiducIary obligatIons, mIsapprOprIatIon, unfaIr
competitIon, and mfrIngement of property rIghts. 46 Like patent
policy trade secret law IS concerned with prOVIding mcentIves to
mventors. 47 "[T]he first prmciple of trade secret law IS the 'inher
ent rIght' of an mnovator to try to keep hIS mnovatIon secret,
whereas one of the poliCIes of the patent system IS to promote dis
closure. "48 Trade secret law however does not necessarily discour
age disclosure. The dissent m Qutck Pomt at the court of appeals
level VIewed trade secret protectIon m licensmg agreements as en
couragmg disclosure to a manufacturer Although thIs prIvate dis
closure does not necessarily foster competitIon, it does promote
utilizatIon of the mventIon. 49 There IS no dismcentIve to patent,
according to the dissent, because the greater value of a patent li
cense whICh protects agamst copymg would be taken mto conSIder
atIon m the bargaInmg process. ThIS premmm was reflected m the
hIgher royaltIes for the patent perIod m the QUIck Pomt contract. 50
Like patent protectIon, then, trade secret protectIon encourages m
ventIon, offermg protectIOn to mventIons of a lesser degree of mno
vatIon. 51
The Issue m QUlck Pomt was whether a licensmg agreement
for an unpatented mventIon may mvolve royalty agreements for a
44. 440 U.S. at 262.
45. See Doerfer, The LImits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by Federal Patent
and Antitrust Supremacy, 80 HARV L. REv 1432, 1432, 1451 (1967); Johnson, Reme
dies In Trade Secret Litigation, 72 Nw U.L. REv 1004, 1028 (1978); Orenbuch, su
pra note 35, at 638.
46. Comment, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of Inventions
Meeting Judicial Standards of Patentability, 87 HARV L. REV 807 826 (1974).
47. 416 U.S. at 481.
48. Doerfer, supra note 45, at 1441.
49. 567 F.2d at 765; Milgnm, supra note 18, at 18 n.5.
50. 567 F.2d, at 766.
51. 416 U.S. at 493. It must be noted that although parallel to patent protection
and without statutory time limit, thiS protection IS more limited. There IS no pro
tection agaInst Independent development by thIrd parties. Once an Invention IS pub
lic, anyone IS free to copy or reverse engIneer the discovery.
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longer penod of tIme than would be allowable under federal patent
law 52 AnalYSIS of pnor cases clearly Indicated that the court of ap
peals deCISIon warranted reversal. Although cited by the majority
In the court of appeals, Lear was pnmarily concerned with the
public policy of encouragIng challenges to patents. Since a patent
licensee who paId the royaltIes had the most economIC IncentIve to
challenge a patent, the doctrIne of licensee estoppel prohibitIng
such challenges VIOlated that public policy Since no patent Issued
In QUIck POInt, the policy conSIderatIons of Lear are not applica
ble. 53 The Supreme Court noted thIS, uneqUIvocably statmg:
"[N]either the holding nor the ratIonale of Lear controls when no
"54
patent has Issued.
The fears expressed In Sears that competitIon would be lim
ited are also unwarranted under the QUIck POInt facts. Sears and
Compco were concerned with unfaIr competitIon and the freedom
of competitors to copy 55 The deSIgn m Sears beIng protected by
IllinOIS law had already been disclosed to the public by distributIon
and IllinOIS was constraInIng all possible competitors. 56 In QUIck
POInt, the licensmg agreement bound no one except the licensee.
Competitors of QUIck Pomt were copymg the keyholder QUIck
Pomt was obliged to pay royaltIes, but also had the optIon to cease
manufacturmg the keyholder 57
52. See text accompanying notes 53-62 mfra.
53. The Court m Lear weighed the competing considerations of contract law
and federal patent law.
On the one hand, the law of contracts forbids purchaser to repudiate hiS
promises Simply because he later becomes dissatisfied with the bargam he
has made. On the other hand, federal law reqUIres that all Ideas m general
Circulation be dedicated to the common good unless they are protected by
valid patent.
395 U.S. at 668.
54. 440 U.S. at 264.
55. 376 U.S. at 231-32.
56. See Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 263 (2d Cir. 1971);
Johnson, supra note 45, at 1006. The Court In Sears was really consldenng Stiffel'
activities as VIOlation of federal antitrust policy rather than federal patent policy
and would be better understood In those terms. Doerfer, supra note 45 at 1457, 1461.
The public does not have nght to unpatented mformation that has not been al
ready disclosed. Wydick, Trade Secrets: Federal Preemption In LIght of Goldstein
and Kewanee (Part II), 56 J. PAT. OFF SOC'Y 4, 20-21 (1974).
57 It IS Important to distinguish between contracts In whICh parties Intend
the obligation to be perpetual from those In whICh there IS no fixed date of termma
tion, but where termination IS conditioned on an event. See Warner-Lambert Phar
maceutical Co. v. Reynolds, 178 F Supp. 655, 661-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), afi'd, 280
F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960). After more than 75 years of paymg royalties on the formula
for Llsterme, Warner-Lambert sought release from the contract. The court upheld the
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The most recent Supreme Court declSlon m thIs line, Ke
wanee held that m a trade secret misappropnatIon case, state
trade secret law was not preempted by federal patent law 58 The
Qutck Pomt dissent m the court of appeals opmed that by Implica
tion, Kewanee also approved enforcement of trade secret licensmg
agreements, thereby limitmg the potentially broad Implications of
Lear 59 ThIS mterpretatIon of Kewanee IS buttressed by the
Califorma declSlon m Stnclatr v. AquarIus ElectronIcs. 6o The court
m Sinclatr found that the policy pnncipies consIdered decIsIve m
Kewanee are applicable with equal, if not greater, force to a pn
vate contract where the licensee voluntarily assumes that m return
for gammg posseSSIon of a trade secret he IS gomg to pay the
agreed consIderation to the mventor "61 Other cases with congru
ent fact patterns would uphold the Qmck Pomt contract. 62 Thus,
the Supreme Court's declSlon m Qutck Pomt to reverse was well
grounded.
The consequences of affirmmg the court of appeals declSlon
and disallowmg trade secret licensmg agreements m order to fur
ther patent law policy would have been detnmental to the dissemI
nation of new Ideas. Since the court of appeals concern seemed to
be that royalties under the contract for an unpatented Idea had to
be paid for a longer penod than allowable under the patent laws,
the mam thrust of affirmmg the court of appeals declSlon would
have been to prohibit licensmg agreements with royalty payments
for more than seventeen years. Presumably thIS would not have
been restncted to situations where patents had been applied for
and demed, because potential licensees would have cIrcumvented
thIS limitation by SImply not applymg for a patent. If payments had
been restncted to seventeen years, mventors mIght have preferred
to sell theIr Ideas for a lump sum payment whICh would not have
been prohibited by a declSlon affirmmg the court of appeals. 63 Per
centage royalty payments are usually agreed on because of the dif
contract, ruling that the obligation to pay continued until the company ceased to
manufacture or sell Llstenne. 178 F Supp. at 660.
58. 416 U.S. at 493.
59. 567 F.2d at 765.
60. 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 116 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1974) (enforced royalty agreement
obligating AquarIUS to pay royalties on Sinclair unpatented deVICe whICh converted
brain waves mto an audible form).
61. Id. at 225, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
62. Pamton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971) (involvmg the
licensmg of deSigns for electromc components); Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co.
v. Reynolds, 178 F Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), a/i'd, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960).
63. 84 HARv L. REV 477,482-83 (1970).
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ficulty In valuIng prospectively a new Idea. 64 If the lump sum sales
of Ideas were substituted for licenSIng agreements, they would be
premIsed on hIghly speculative pnces whICh manufacturers mIght
not be willing to pay Thus, the effect would have been to reduce
the number of new Ideas exposed to the public. ThIs mIght have
Increased disclosure for clearly patentable Inventions but would
have decreased dissemInation of unpatentable Ideas and Ideas of
doubtful patentability 65 ThIS result loses the advantages of maIn
taInIng a supplementary system of protection. The pnme disadvan
tage of elimInatIng long term licenSIng of trade secrets would have
fallen upon Inventors who do not have the financIal capability of
manufacturIng theIr own Inventions. Ideas belongmg to large
compames could still have been utilized without the disclosure re
qmred by patent law 66
IV

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS NOT CONSIDERED
BY THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court unammously reversed the court of ap
peals, denymg any conflict between enforcement of the Qmck
Pomt contract and federal patent policy The Court found enforce
ment of the agreement even less m conflict with the patent system
than state trade secret law and saId:
The most commonly accepted definitIon of trade secrets IS re
stricted to confidentIal mformation whICh IS not disclosed m the
normal process of exploitation
Accordingly the exploita
tIon of trade secrets under state law may not satIsfy the federal
policy m favor of disclosure, whereas disclosure IS mescapable m
exploitmg a deVIce like the Aronson keyholder. 67

The Court's declSlon to enforce the contract was a relatively
easy one because Aronson s Invention was completely revealed
upon exammatIon of the keyholder The Court's opmlOn stated:
The deVIce whICh IS the subject of thIS contract ceased to
have any secrecy as soon as it was first marketed, yet when the
contract was negotIated the mventIveness and novelty were suffi
CIently apparent to mduce an experienced novelty manufacturer
to agree to pay for the opportunity to be first m the market.
Federal patent law IS not a barrier to such a contract. 68
64. ld. at 482.
65. 416 U.S. at 486; Pamton & Co. v. Bourns Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 223 (2d Cir.
1971); 84 HARV L. REv 477 482 (1970).
66. 416 U.S. at 486.
67. 440 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added).
68. ld.
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A vOId, therefore, eXIsts m the Court's opmIOn. The question
remams whether a sImilar contract regarding an Idea not totally
disclosed upon mspectIon of the item would be enforceable. En
forcement of the QUick Pomt contract furthers the federal policy of
disclosure of mventIons, but thIS would be true primarily for items
whICh could be easily reverse engmeered. The Court did not deal
with thIs problem. In a rather cursory deCISIon, the Court reversed
the court of appeals, Ignormg situations not covered by the facts of
thIS case, such as where mventIons cannot be easily reverse engI
neered. It need not have done so.
The Court could have affirmed or reversed the court of ap
peals declSlon, abolishmg state protection for trade secret licensmg
agreements, upholding such protection (perhaps while requestmg
explicit gUidelines from Congress), or modifymg the amount of pro
tection allowed through partial preemptIOn. The Court mIght have
followed the course of its deCISIon m Gold,stetn. 69 In dealing with
state copYright laws m Goldstetn, the Court upheld state protec
tion, emphasIzmg the need to distmgUIsh situations of possible con
flict between federal and state laws from those m whICh conflicts
would necessarily arIse. 70 It found it difficult to see how concurrent
powers of Congress and the states m the cOPYright area would
necessarily and mevitably lead to conflicts.71 By analogy one
mIght argue that state trade secret and contract laws also should
not be preempted. 72 Here, too, there IS no mevitable conflict. Per
haps thIS IS not a matter for JudiCIal declSlon but an Issue for con
gressIOnal action. In the new federal copYright law for example,
state laws are explicitly preempted or explicitly left mtact.73 The
Goldstetn Court made it plam that the Constitution did not itself
deny state protection of copynghts. 74 As with copynghts, m the ab
sence of congressIOnal action regarding trade secrets, one may ar
gue that state law may be left mtact. 75 Furthermore, the long con
69. 412 U.S. 546. Goldstem was convicted under California statute forbidding
the puating of recordings produced by others. He moved to dismiSS the complamt
claiming that the California law was m conflict with federal copynght laws. ld. at
548.
70. Id. at 554.
71. ld. at 559. Further, the Court mterpreted the language of the Constitution
proViding for copynghts "for limited Times as limitation on Congress and stated
that state statute cannot be VOided because of the mdefinite duration of its protec
tion. ld. at 560-61 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, d. 8).
72. The Kewanee Court makes thiS analogy. 416 U.S. at 478-79.
73. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
74. 412 U.S. at 553, 560.
75. See Wydick, supra note 56, at 10; Comment, Goldstem v. California: Break
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gressIOnal silence regarding trade secrets mIght be deemed
eVIdence of a lack of preemptIve mtent. Indeed, some federal stat
utes Implicitly recogmze trade secret law 76
Trade secret protectIon offers an alternatIve system to the
patent system. Advantages over the patent system, such as lower
costs, mdefinite duratIon, and lack of the need to meet an obJec
tIve standard of novelty are balanced by nsks that do not eXIst m
the patent system, such as nonexclusIvity of nghts after mdepend
ent discovery or reverse engmeermg. 77 The Kewanee Court found
that another form of mcentIve to mventIon was not mconsIstent
with patent policy 78 Indeed, trade secret laws supplement the
patent system by allowmg protectIon for mventIons whICh fall be
low the standards reqUIred by the patent laws. 79
The Court mIght have preempted state protectIon for patent
able Ideas. Trade secret protectIon mIght have been reserved for
those mventIons clearly not patentable m order to create additIonal
mcentIves to obtam patents. 80 ThIS would have led, however, to
problems m determmmg whICh mventIons are patentable 81 or,
usmg a lesser standard, what a reasonable mventor would consIder
clearly patentable. 82 Pressure would thus be exerted for mventors
to obtam patents for Ideas of dubIOUS patentability PotentIal licen
sees would find it profitable to assert the patentability of mventIons
to negate trade secret protectIon and then challenge the patent
after Issuance, thereby relievmg the mventor of patent protectIon.
Indeed the Lear decIsIon exacerbated one of the problems of the
patent system by encouragmg challenges to patents. 83 Perhaps thIS
mg up Federal Copynght Preemption, 74 COLUM. L. REV 960, 964 (1974). More ng
orous standards reqmred for patents may diminIsh the value of USing copyright de
velopments by analogy to patent law. Id. at 973.
76. E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c){4)(1976) (government agencies must conduct pub
lic meetings except for those portions of meeting whICh are likely to disclose trade
secrets); Id. § 1905 (sanctions Imposed on federal officers or employees who disclose
trade secrets learned In the course of office or employment). See also Milgnm,
supra note 18, at 32; Wydick, supra note 56, at 14.
77 Rosenberg, supra note 32, at 15; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, Comment
(a) (1939).
78. 416 U.S. at 483-84.
79. Doerfer, supra note 45, at 1456; Milgnm, supra note 18, at 34; Orenbuch,
supra note 35, at 664-65; Wydick, supra note 56, at 27-28.
80. 416 U.S. at 492; Orenbuch, supra note 35, at 665; Stern, A Reexammation
of State Trade Secret Law after Kewanee, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REv 927, 931 (1974);
see Comment, supra note 46, at 807.
81. See Comment, supra note 46, at 807
82. Stern, supra note 80, at 986.
83. Although challenge may be unsuccessful, the expense of defending such
suit could be rumous for patentee.
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problem could be allevIated by legIslation convertmg patent li
censes to trade secret licenses m the event of a patent bemg suc
cessfully challenged.
Another alternative would have been preemption m terms of
remedy only m order to comply with federal patent policIes. The
Court could have allowed trade secret protection but disallowed
any nghts m excess of those allowed by federal patent law In
terms of trade secret licensmg agreements, thIs would mean limit
mg royalties to a seventeen-year penod,84 and mandating disclo
sure after thIs tIme. 85 In cases of trade secret misappropnatIon
or breach of contract actions between employer and employee, the
Court could have restncted remedies to money damages and disal
lowed permanent mJunctIons. 86 ThIS limitation would meet the ob
Jections expressed by Justice Douglas m hIS Kewanee dissent. 87
ThIS mIght be more conSIstent with the federal patent policy fa
vonng disclosure while permittmg the mnovatIon also fostered by
trade secret protection.
Since the Court found no need for preemption at all, it mIght
have suggested congressIonal action to federalize trade secret pro
tection by Implementmg a two-tiered federal system whICh would
offer lesser advantages for mventIons whICh do not meet the stnct
standards now reqUIred by the patent system.
V

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has deCIded that a contract requmng roy
alties for longer than seventeen years for a deVIce completely dis
closed on exposure and for whICh a patent was demed, does not
conflict with federal patent policy Although clearly mandated by
pnor cases, thIs deCISIon IS troublesome m terms of both its POSSI
ble application to agreements on deVIces whICh are not readily re
vealed and possible dismcentIves for mventors to enter the patent
system. Since patent nghts eXIst for only seventeen years, a con
tract whICh calls for royalties over a longer penod may grant advan
tages greater than those that can be legally obtamed through the
federal patent system. Perhaps the emphaSIS should be on the
Goldstem Court's concept of actively encouragmg mventors to en
84. See Doerfer, supra note 45, at 1148. An amicus cunae bnef III Qu.ck Pomt
suggests limiting royalties, not by duration, but by
court determmed head start
value. Bnef for Ercon, Inc., as AmiCUS Cunae at 8.
85. Orenbuch, supra note 35, at 676-77
86. Johnson, supra note 45, at lO27; Stem, supra note SO, at 931.
87 416 U.S. at 496,499.
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ter the patent system rather than Justice Marshall's VIew of offermg
a passIve alternative. Although the Court states that enforcement
of thIS agreement does not discourage anyone from seektng a
patent,"88 thIS conclusIon IS questionable. In VIew of the seventeen
year limitation Imposed on royalties and the encouragement gIven,
by Lear to patent challenges, it IS not clear that an mventor whose
Idea IS not as easily revealed as Aronson s would nsk the disclosure
mvolved m a patent application rather than rely on pnvate
licensmg agreements. In such a case, the federal policy desmng
disclosure of new Ideas would be frustrated.
The Supreme Court declSlon IS disappomtmg m its failure to
explicate the policIes surrounding thIS declSlon. The Court cited
Kewanee regarding its concern to encourage mventIon m areas
where patent law does not reach. "89 It would have been prefer
able to expand on thIS concern by encouragmg Congress to reVIse
patent law to reach these areas.

Manan Solomon Lubmsky
88. 440 U.S. at 263.
89. ld. at 266 (quoting, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. at 485).

